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Many software security vulnerabilities only reveal themselves under certain conditions, 
i.e., particular configurations and inputs together with a certain runtime environment. 
One approach to detecting these vulnerabilities is fuzz testing that feeds randomly 
generated inputs to the software and witnesses its failures. However, typical fuzz testing 
makes no guarantees regarding the syntactic and semantic validity of the input, or of how 
much of the input space will be explored. To address these problems, we present a new 
testing methodology called Configuration Fuzzing. Configuration Fuzzing is a technique 
whereby the configuration of the running application is mutated at certain execution 
points, in order to check for vulnerabilities that only arise in certain conditions. As the 
application runs in the deployment environment, this testing technique continuously 
fuzzes the configuration and checks "security invariants'' that, if violated, indicate a 
vulnerability. We discuss the approach and introduce a prototype framework called 
ConFu (CONfiguration FUzzing testing framework) implementation. We also present the 
results of case studies that demonstrate the approach's feasibility and evaluate its 
performance. 
 
Keywords: Vulnerability; Configuration Fuzzing; Fuzz testing; In Vivo testing; Security 
invariants 
 
1    INTRODUCTION 
As the Internet has grown in popularity, security testing is undoubtedly becoming a 
crucial part of the development process for commercial software, especially for server 
applications. However, it is often impossible in terms of time and cost to test all 
configurations or to simulate all system environments before releasing the software into 
the field, not to mention the fact that software distributors may later add more 
configuration options. The configuration of a software system is a set of options that are 
responsible for a user's preferences and the choice of hardware, functionality, etc. 
Sophisticated software systems always have a large number of possible configurations, 
e.g., a recent version of Firefox has more than 2
30
 possible configurations, and testing all 
of them is infeasible before the release. Fuzz testing as a form of black-box testing was 
introduced to address this problem [23], and empirical studies [14] have proven its 
effectiveness in revealing vulnerabilities in software systems. Yet, typical fuzz testing has 
been inefficient in two aspects. First, it is poor at exposing certain errors, as most 
generated inputs fail to satisfy syntactic or semantic constraints and therefore cannot 
exercise deeper code. Second, given the immensity of the input space, there are no 
guarantees as to how much of it will be explored  [4].  
 
To address these limitations, this thesis presents a new testing methodology called 
Configuration Fuzzing, and a prototype framework called ConFu (CONfiguration 
FUzzing framework). Instead of generating random inputs that may be semantically 
invalid that would not pass the syntactic checks, ConFu mutates the application 
configuration in a way that helps valid inputs exercise the deeper components of the 
software-under-test and check for violations of program-specific "security invariants" [2]. 
These invariants represent rules that, if broken, indicate the existence of a potential 
vulnerability. Examples of security invariants may include: avoiding memory leakage 
that may lead to denial of service; a user should never gain access to files that do not 
belong to him; critical data should never be transmitted over the Internet; only certain 
sequences of function calls should be allowed, etc. ConFu mutates the configuration 
using the incremental covering array algorithm [6], a pairwise testing approach that 
captures the abstraction and generality of all possible configurations, therefore 
guaranteeing considerable coverage of the configuration space in the lifetime of a certain 
release of the software.  
 
Configuration Fuzzing works as follows:  Given an application to test, the testers 
annotate the configuration variables to be fuzzed in the configuration file and choose the 
functions to test. By fuzzing we mean changing a variable’s value. After this, they write 
surveillance functions for specific security invariants they are willing to check. The 
framework then generates the actual code for a fuzzer that mutates the values of the 
chosen configuration variables, as well as the test functions for each chosen function. 
Next, the framework creates instrumentation such that whenever a chosen function is 
called, the corresponding test function is executed in a sandbox with the mutated 
configuration and the security invariants are checked with the surveillance functions. 
Violations of these security invariants are logged and sent back to the developer.  
 
Configuration Fuzzing is based on the observation that most vulnerabilities occur under 
specific configurations with certain inputs [21], i.e., an application running with one 
configuration may prevent the user from doing something bad, while another might not. 
Configuration Fuzzing occurs within software as it runs in the deployment environment. 
This allows it to conduct tests in application states and environments that may not have 
been conceived in the lab. In addition, the effectiveness of ConFu is increased by using 
real-world user inputs rather than randomly generated ones. However, the fuzzing of the 
configuration occurs in an isolated "sandbox" that is created as a clone of the original 
process, so that it does not affect the end user of the program. When a vulnerability is 
detected, detailed information is collected and sent back to a server for later analysis.    
 
The rest of this thesis is organized as follows. Section 2 formalizes the problem statement, 
and identifies requirements that a solution must meet. Section 3 discusses the background, 
proposes the Configuration Fuzzing approach, and provides the architecture of the 
framework-called ConFu. Section 4 looks at the results of our case studies and 
performance evaluation. Related work is then discussed in Section 5. The thesis ends 
with limitations in Section 6, and finally the conclusion in Section 7. 
 
2    PROBLEM AND REQUIREMENTS 
2.1 Definitions 
This section formalizes some terms that are used throughout the thesis: 
 Configuration: An arrangement of settings that represents a user’s preferences and 
the choice of hardware, functionality, etc. 
 
 Vulnerability: A term in computer security which refers to weaknesses that allow 
malicious users to break into a system or escalate their privileges. 
 Behavior Bug: Functional bugs are defects that do not break a system’s security in 
contrast to vulnerabilities. 
 
 Configuration Fuzzing: A methodology of testing that mutates the configuration of a 
software system to check for vulnerabilities after the software is released. 
 
 ConFu: Configuration Fuzzing framework for software vulnerability detection 
 
 Security Invariant [2]: Representing rules that, if broken, indicate the existence of 
vulnerabilities. 
 
 Surveillance Function: Functions that checks for violations of security invariants 
throughout the testing process. 
 
 In Vivo Testing [18]: A perpetual testing [20] approach that continues the testing 
process of a software through the deployment stage after it is released. 
 
 Covering Array [11]: A mathematical object that can be used for software testing 
purposes, which ensures that the tests can cover a degree of percentage of all possible 
use cases. 
 
2.2  Problem statement 
We have observed that configuration together with user input are the major factors of 
vulnerability exploitation [30]. However, it is generally infeasible to test all functionality 
with all possible configurations, in terms of time and cost, before releasing the software 
into the field. For example, the Apache HTTP server has more than 50 options that 
generate over 2
50
 possible settings, and certain vulnerabilities
i , ii
 will only reveal 
themselves under specific configurations with specific user inputs. The effectiveness and 
efficiency of detecting such vulnerabilities in the testing process is greatly hampered due 
to the immensity of both the configuration and input space. Another issue of security 
testing resides in the difficulty of detecting vulnerabilities when the characteristics of the 
vulnerabilities are not deterministic and differ greatly from behavior bugs. A "test oracle" 
[25] alone is only sufficient in evaluating the correctness of a software with respect to its 
functionality but not its security. Furthermore, most configuration testing approaches 
such as Skoll [17] or MSET [9] provide little feedback beyond "pass/fail" and do not 
address security issues.  
 
2.3  Requirements 
A solution to this problem would need to address not only the issue of the immensity of 
the configuration and the input space, but also consider the effectiveness and efficiency 
of characterizing vulnerabilities and providing detailed information regarding detected 
vulnerabilities. Such a solution should meet the following requirements: 
 
Guarantee a considerable degree of coverage of the configuration space. In a 
limited amount of time, the solution has to guarantee sufficient coverage of the 
configuration space. Because some options have to match the external environment such 
as operating system, it might be impossible to provide full-coverage testing. However, 
the solution must at least have covered the most common configurations.   
 
Support representative user inputs with which to test. The solution has to optimize 
the number of possible user inputs for a given configuration. The validity of the user 
inputs is crucial and these inputs should satisfy syntactic and semantic constraints and 
therefore exercise the deeper components of the software. “Maximum” coverage of the 
input space is desired, but with “minimum” actual test cases. 
 
Be able to detect the most common vulnerabilities and provide an easy-to-use 
API to add rules for detecting other vulnerabilities. The solution should provide an 
effective mechanism to detect common kinds of security issues such as directory traversal, 
denial of service, insufficient access control, etc. Also, it must be easy to add an 
additional rule if a new vulnerability or exploit arises, without having to change the 
existing framework.  
 
Be capable of reporting vulnerabilities back to the software developers. If a test 
fails and a vulnerability is discovered, the framework must allow for feedback to be sent 
to the software developers so that the failure can be analyzed and, ideally, fixed. In 
addition to sending a notification of a discovered vulnerability, the framework should 
also send back useful information about the system state so that the vulnerability can be 
reproduced. 
 
Have low performance impact. The user of a system that is conducting tests on itself 
during execution should not observe any noticeable performance degradation. The tests 
must be unobtrusive to the end user, both in terms of functionality and any configuration 
or setup, in addition to performance. 
 
3    APPROACH 
3.1  Background 
Configuration Fuzzing is designed as an extension to the In Vivo Testing approach [18], 
which was originally introduced to detect behavioral bugs that reside in software products. 
In Vivo Testing was principally inspired by the notion of "perpetual testing" [20] [22], 
which suggests that latent defects still reside in many (if not all) software products and 
these defects may reveal themselves when the application executes in states that were 
unanticipated and/or untested in the development environment. Therefore, testing of 
software should continue throughout the entire lifetime of the application. In Vivo 
Testing approaches this problem by executing tests at specified points in the context of 
the running program after the software is released. 
 
In Vivo Testing conducts tests and checks properties of the software in a duplicated 
process of the original; this ensures that, although the tests themselves may alter the state 
of the application, these changes happen in the duplicated process, so that any changes to 
the state are not seen by the user. This duplicated process can simply be created using a 
"fork'' system call, though this only creates a copy of the in-process memory. If the test 
needs to modify any local files, In Vivo tests can use a "process domain'' [19] to create a 
more robust "sandbox'' that includes a copy-on-write view of the file system. This layered 
file system allows different processes to have their own view of the file system, sharing 
any read only files but writing into their own private copies of files and directories. 
 
In previous research into In Vivo Testing, the approach of continuing to test these 
applications even after deployment was proven to be both effective and efficient in 
finding remaining misbehavior flaws related to functional correctness [3][18], but not 
necessarily security defects. In this work, we extend the In Vivo Testing approach to 
specifically look for security vulnerabilities. 
 
Extending the In Vivo Testing approach to Configuration Fuzzing is motivated by 
three concerns.  
 
First, many security-related bugs only reveal themselves under certain conditions, 
reflected in the configuration of the software together with its runtime environment. For 
instance, the FTP server wu-ftpd 2.4.2 assigns a particular user ID to the FTP client in 
certain configurations such that authentication can succeed even though no password 
entry is available for a user, thus allowing remote attackers to gain privileges
iii
. As 
another example, certain versions of the FTP server vsftpd, when under heavy load, may 
allow attackers to cause a denial of service (crash) via a SIGCHLD signal during a 
malloc or free call
iv
, depending on the software's configuration. Because In Vivo tests 
execute within the current environment of the program, rather than by creating a clean 
slate, it follows that Configuration Fuzzing increases the possibility of detecting such 
vulnerabilities that only appear under certain conditions.  
 
Second, the "perpetual testing" foundation of In Vivo Testing ensures that testing can 
be carried out after the software is released. Continued testing improves the amount of 
the configuration space that can be explored through fuzzing; therefore it is more likely 
that an instance will find vulnerabilities under their error-prone configurations. 
 
Third, In Vivo Testing uses real-world user inputs, which may be more likely to 
trigger vulnerabilities. Due to the impossibility of full coverage of the input space [27], 
using real-world user inputs has a higher probability of detecting vulnerabilities over 
contrived lab inputs. 
 
3.2  Model  
When an instrumented function is called, Configuration Fuzzing mutates the 
application configuration under predefined configuration constraints of the 
software-under-test to look for potential vulnerabilities. By extending the In Vivo 
Testing approach, Configuration Fuzzing tests are executed in the field, after 
deployment, and will provide representative real-world user inputs to test with and reveal 
vulnerabilities that are dependent on the application state. Furthermore, surveillance 
functions using security invariants are executed throughout the test in order to detect 
violations of security rules, which indicate the occurrence of potential vulnerabilities. 
 
 
Figure 1.  The model of Configuration Fuzzing Testing 
 
The model of Configuration Fuzzing Testing is shown in Figure 1. Given a function 
named f with input x to test, we create a sandbox (illustrated by fork() in Figure 1) before 
f actually gets called. The sandbox is a replica of the original process with the same 
system state. The original function f will be executed in the original process as normal 
while Configuration Fuzzing tests take place in the sandbox.  
 
Configuration Fuzzing tests are composed of three parts. First, configuration variables 
are mutated. However, since Configuration Fuzzing tests take place in a replica of the 
original process, the configuration variables stay unchanged in the original process.  
Second, the original function f is executed with the mutated configuration trying to 
exploit potential vulnerabilities. As the epilogue of the duplicated process, a surveillance 
function that checks for violation of security invariants is called so as to detect any 
vulnerability exploitation and send reports to the system administrator or developers if 
found. After this, the test process is terminated while the original process continues. 
 
3.3  Architecture 
Here we introduce the architecture of a framework called ConFu (Configuration Fuzzing 
framework for vulnerability detection). ConFu mutates the configuration of an 
application with a covering array algorithm [11] and checks for vulnerabilities using 
surveillance functions that monitor violations of security invariants. This framework 
allows the application to be tested as it runs in the field, using real input data. As 
described above, multiple invocations of the instrumented functions are run; however, the 
additional invocations must not affect the user and must run in a separate sandbox. The 
steps that software testers would take when using ConFu are as follows: 
  
Step 1: Identifying the configuration/setting variables. Most software applications 
use external configuration, such as .config or .ini files, and/or internal configuration, 
namely global variables. Given an application to be tested, the tester first locates these 
configuration parameters that can be mutated. We assume that the tester can annotate or 
create the configuration files in such a way that each field is followed by the 
corresponding variable from the source code and the range of possible values of that 
variable. A sample annotated configuration file is shown in Figure 2, with the 
corresponding variables and their values in braces. The examples listed are taken from 
our empirical study in Section 4 using OpenSSH
v
, a secure shell server. 
 
 
Figure 2. Part of the annotated configuration file for OpenSSH 
 
Our method mainly fuzzes those configuration variables that are responsible for 
changing modes or enabling options. These variables often have a binary value of 1/0 or 
y/n, or sometimes a sequence of numbers representing different modes. Not all 
configuration variables are modifiable in the sense of revealing vulnerabilities, e.g., 
fuzzing the host IP address of an FTP server will only lead to unable-to-connect errors. 
Also, configuration variables that rely on external limitations, such as hardware 
compatibility, should not be fuzzed. For instance, changing the variable representing the 
number of CPUs to four when the actual host only has two might cause vulnerabilities 
instead of detecting them. On the other hand, a considerable number of vulnerabilities are 
triggered under certain mode/option combinations in network-related applications. For 
example, WinFTP FTP Server 2.3.0, in passive mode, allows remote authenticated users 
to cause a denial of service via a sequence of FTP sessions
vi
. Also, some early versions of 
Apache Tomcat allow remote authenticated users to read arbitrary files via a WebDAV 
write request under certain configurations
vii
. By only fuzzing the configuration variables 
representing modes and options, the size of the configuration space that our approach is 
fuzzing decreases considerably; however, even with such a decrease, the configuration 
space may still be too large to test prior to deployment, and thus an In Vivo Testing 
approach such as Configuration Fuzzing is still useful. 
 
 
Figure 3. An example fuzzer for OpenSSH 
 
typedef struct { 
     int x11_forward; 






  /* generate a set of options */ 
      result  r=covering_array();  
      options.x11_forward = r.x11_forward;   
      options.tcp_keep_alive = r.tcp_keep_alive;  
...                                     
} 
X11Forwarding yes      #[options.x11_forwarding]@{0,1} 
TCPKeepAlive yes      #[options.tcp_keep_alive]@{0,1} 
UseLogin          no       #[options.use_login]@{0,1} 
Protocol            1         #[options.protocol]@{1,2,3} 
Step 2: Generating fuzzing code. Given the variables to fuzz and their corresponding 
possible values (as specified in the configuration file), a pre-processor produces a 
function that is used to fuzz the configuration, as shown in Figure 3. The fuzz_config() 
function uses a covering array algorithm [11] to ensure a certain degree of coverage when 
exhaustive exploration of the configuration space is impossible in the lifetime of the 
software.  
 
Consider k as the number of variables a configuration needs to specify and v as the 
number of possible values each of the k variables can be. We define the level of coverage 
in terms of a parameter t, which if equal to k will produce full coverage, and produce no 
coverage when equal to zero. The set of configurations generated is called a t-way 
covering array. Take a simple program that uses three (k=3) binary (v=2) variables as an 
example. A 3-way covering array will include all 2
3
 configurations, therefore 
guaranteeing full coverage. A 2-way covering array will look like Figure 3-2; we notice 
that whichever two columns out of the three columns are chosen, all possible pairs of 
values appear. Specifically, the pairs 00, 01, 10 and 11 all appear in the rows when we 
look at the columns of AB only, AC only and BC only. This property is called "2-
coverage", and corresponds to t=2. A notion called CAN(t, k ,v) represents the number of 
configurations in the smallest (optimal) set that holds the "t-coverage" property for a 
configuration space of size k
v
. When using the covering array algorithm, our approach 
will start mutating the configuration variables with a CAN(2, k, v) covering array and 
increase t afterwards if time permits. Ideally it would be possible to take t=k, but that 
might lead to too many configurations to test. National Institution of Standards and 
Technology has empirically demonstrated that for most software t need not be more than 
6 to find all errors [12]. The covering_array() function is implemented using Jenny
viii
, an 
open sourced covering array generator. 
 
 
Figure 3-2. A 2-way covering array 
 
Step3: Identifying functions to test. The tester then chooses the functions that are to 
be the instrumentation points for Configuration Fuzzing. These can conceivably be all of 
the functions in the program, but would generally be the points at which vulnerabilities 
would most likely be revealed, or the functions that are related to the configuration 
variables being fuzzed. Future work could investigate a general approach to determine 
which functions to test. The chosen functions are annotated with a special tag in the 
source code. Figure 4 shows an annotated function do_child(). 
A  B  C 
0   0   0 
0   1   1 
1   0   1 
1   1   0 
 
Figure 4. Annotated function do_child() 
 
Step4: Generating test code. As an example, given an original function named 
do_child() in the program OpenSSH, a pre-processor first renames it to 
ConFu_do_child(), then generates a skeleton for a test function named 
ConFu_test_do_child(), which is an instance of a Configuration Fuzzing test. In the test 
function, the configuration fuzzer (as described above) is first called, and then the 
original function ConFu_do_child() is invoked.  
 
 
Figure 5. Test function for do_child() 
 
Based on the properties of the program being tested, different security invariants are 
predefined by the tester in order to check for violations. The tester writes a surveillance 
function called check_invariants() according to these security invariants. For example, 
the function could use the substring function strstr(current_directory, legal_directory) to 
check that the user's current directory has a specified legal directory as its root; if this 
function indicates otherwise, it may imply that the user has performed an illegal directory 
traversal. As another example, the check_invariants() function may simply wait to see if 
the original function ConFu_do_child() returns at all; if it does not, the process may have 
been killed or be hanging as a result of a potential vulnerability. These surveillance 
functions run throughout the testing process, and record every security invariant violation 
with the fault-revealing configuration into a log file that could be sent to a server for later 
analysis. Figure 5 shows the test function for function do_child(). By default, ConFu has 
three built-in security invariants that check for denial of service, unauthorized directory 
traversal and insufficient privilege control. 
 
Step 5: Executing tests. In the last step, a wrapper function with the name do_child() 
is created. As in the In Vivo Testing approach, when the function do_child() is called, it 
first forks to create a new process that is a replica of the original. The child process (or 




     ... 




     fuzz_config(); /*Fuzz configuration*/ 
     ConFu_do_child(…);  /*Call the 
original function*/ 
     check_invariants(); 
} 
Configuration Fuzzing and then exits. Because the Configuration Fuzzing occurs in a 
separate process from the original, the user will not see its output. Meanwhile, the 
original function ConFu_do_child() is invoked in the original process (as seen by the user) 




Figure 6. Wrapper function for do_child() 
 
4    EVALUATION 
4.1  Setup 
In order to demonstrate the feasibility of using Configuration Fuzzing to detect 
vulnerabilities, we reproduced certain known vulnerabilities and used ConFu to find them. 
The vulnerability we chose is that early versions of OpenSSH do not properly drop 
privileges when the UseLogin option is enabled, which allows local users to execute 
arbitrary commands by providing the command to the ssh daemon
ix
. The CVSS Severity
x
 
of this vulnerability was 10 (the highest) and we believe it was mainly caused by 
insufficient testing of the configurations of OpenSSH. We chose this vulnerability not 
only because of its high severity but also because insufficient privilege control is one of 
the most common vulnerabilities besides denial of service and unauthorized directory 
traversal. The following lists the details of each step in using ConFu to detect the 
vulnerability. 
 
 Identifying the configuration variables 
The sshd server OpenSSH 2.1.0 was used as the program-under-test in our feasibility 
study. From the configuration file (sshd_config) we found that there are a total of 15 
modifiable (fuzzable) configuration variables: permit_root_login, ignore_ rhosts, 
ignore_user_known_hosts, strict_modes, x11_forwarding, print_motd, keepalives, 
rhosts_authentication, password_authentication, permit_empty_passwd, kerberos_authen 
tication, kerberos_or_local_passwd, kerberos_ticket_cleanup, use_login, and check_mail. 
We annotated these variables with the possible values in the configuration file. 
 
 Generating fuzzing code 
After recognizing these configuration variables, ConFu generated the fuzz_config() 





     int pid = fork();  /*Create new process*/ 
     if(pid == 0) {     /*Test function*/ 
          ConFu_test_do_child(…); 
          exit(0); 
     } 
     return ConFu_do_child(); /*Originalfunction*/ 
} 
 Identifying functions to test 
We picked the do_child() function as the function to test. The reason we picked this 
function in the role of software testers is that do_child() is responsible for creating a 
session and authenticating the user's identity when a ssh client tries to access the sshd 
server, and it is one of the functions most vulnerable to insufficient privilege control. 
Note that a wider range of functions can also be tested, including the main() function. 
 
 Generating test code 
The original function do_child() was renamed by a preprocessor to ConFu_do_child() 
and the test function ConFu_test_do_child() was generated with the fuzz_config() 
function and the check_invariants() function. Several security invariants were checked in 
our experiment, including the security invariant for privilege control, which is that a user 
should never be able to use other users' identities. An initial surveillance function that 
checks this security invariant is shown in Figure 7, which checks whether the user 
identification has changed. 
 
 
Figure 7. Surveillance function for ConFu_test_do_child() 
 
 Executing tests 
Last, ConFu generated a wrapper function with the name do_child() that forks a child 
process to execute the ConFu_test_do_child() function and runs the original function 
ConFu_do_child() in the parent process, as shown in Figure 6. Whenever do_child() gets 
called, the wrapper function gets executed that checks for violation of security invariants 
under the mutated configuration with user input in the duplicated process.  
 
4.2  Results 
To facilitate the exploitation, we simulated both valid and invalid combinations of 
username and password as user inputs in the real-world for the instrumented sshd server. 
If the vulnerability is exploited, the server program records the exploitation with its 
corresponding configuration in a log file
1
. We ran the program 10,000 times, which took 
roughly ten minutes. A fragment of the log file is shown in Figure 8. By analyzing the log 
file, we were able to find the mapping between the UseLogin option and insufficient 
privilege control. It is also worth pointing out that the number of detections in the log file 
was identical to the number of tests where UseLogin was enabled (with valid input). We 
have not yet managed to detect new vulnerabilities, however, this study demonstrates the 
                                                 
1 Might need to raise an alert when an exploitation is detected. 
void check_invariants(Session *s) 
{ 
      if(geteuid() != s.uid || getuid() != s.uid) 
             /* Log the detection */ 
             log(“Insufficient privilege control”); 
       /* Check for other security invariants */ 
             … 
} 




Figure 8. Log file of the OpenSSH server 
 
4.3  Performance 
The performance impact of ConFu is crucial because Configuration Fuzzing tests are 
executed while the program-under-test is running. We evaluated our approach’s 
performance by applying it to the OpenSSH server with the steps stated above. do_child() 
is chosen as the function to test and 15 configuration variables are fuzzed. All 
experiments were conducted on an Intel Core2Quad Q6600 server with a 2.40GHz CPU 





















100 3.446 0.271 0.001 0.037 
1000 42.23 2.434 0.014 0.045 
10000 378.2 29.92 0.157 0.041 
100000 3694 236.8 1.628 0.039 
Figure 9. Overhead of instrumented do_child()(in seconds) with varying number of tests 
 
For both the original code (without instrumentation) and the instrumented code, we 
simulated user inputs (both valid and invalid) for the do_child() function and recorded the 
function’s execution time. The OpenSSH service was provided on the test machine, and 
the do_child() function sent requests to IP address 127.0.0.1 rather than to other servers 
to eliminate any overhead from network traffic. We ran tests in which the function was 
called 100, 1000, 10000 and 100000 times in order to estimate the overhead caused by 
our approach. 
 
Figure 9 shows the results we collected from the experiments. The first column shows 
permit_root_login option is:0 
… 
… 
UseLogin option is:1 
Check_mail option is: 0 
Insufficient privilege control 
 
permit_root_login option is:1 
… 
… 
UseLogin option is:1 
Check_mail option is: 0 
Insufficient privilege control 
the number of tests that were carried out, i.e., the number of times the do_child() function 
was called. The second and third columns are the overhead in seconds for the 
fuzz_config() function and the ConFu_do_child() function, respectively. The total 
average additional time (in seconds) per instrumented test is listed in the last column. 
From the results we can see that the average additional cost per test stayed around 45ms 
and did not increase when the number of tests grew. Thus, a single client of a server 
running OpenSSH with ConFu is unlikely to notice any performance slowdown. It is 
worth mentioning that most of the performance overhead comes from the cost of 
generating the covering arrays in fuzz_config(), and this cost is only affected by the 
number of variables being fuzzed.  
 
To obtain better performance, software testers could, in principle, pre-calculate the 
covering arrays for the chosen configuration variables before the software is shipped. 
However, since many configuration options are enabled or disabled at build time and 
later hotfixes might add more configuration options, it is more secure to calculate the 
covering array during the runtime of the software.  
 
5    RELATED WORK 
5.1  Security testing 
One approach to detecting security vulnerabilities is environment permutation with fault 
injection [13], which perturbs the application external environment during the test and 
checks for symptoms of security violations. Most implementations of this approach view 
the security testing problem as the problem of testing the fault-tolerance properties of a 
software system [5] [24]. They consider each environment perturbation as a fault and the 
resulting security compromise a failure in the toleration of such faults. However, as the 
errors being injected are independent of the software, most of these errors might not 
occur in real-world usage. Therefore, fault injection testing may raise false positives.  
 
Instead of injecting faults, ConFu mutates the configuration under predefined 
configuration constraints of the software-under-test to produce potential vulnerabilities, 
which relies on the internal properties of the software. Hence it would decrease the 
occurrence of false positives considerably. The two approaches, however, could certainly 
be used in conjunction with each other; we leave this as future work. 
 
Another security testing approach used to detect vulnerabilities is anomaly detection 
[10] [15]. Anomaly detection first establishes a model of normal behavior then detects 
data sets that cause the program to not conform to the model. Anomaly detection is 
potentially capable of detecting zero day attacks; however, it is always difficult to define 
normal behavior. Thus, these approaches depend on the validity of the normal behavior 
model being used. Anomaly detection may suffer severely from false positives. 
 
ConFu treats the violations of security invariants as vulnerability exploits, and these 
security invariants are defined based on the consequences of known abnormal behaviors. 
In a sense, ConFu uses a model of abnormal behaviors that is much easier to obtain than a 
model of normal behaviors. Hence ConFu would be expected to have fewer false 
positives; however, further empirical studies are needed to compare the effectiveness and 
efficiency between these two approaches. 
Another popular approach is fuzz testing [23]. It simply feeds randomly generated 
inputs to a software application and monitors its failures. Typical fuzz testing is scalable, 
automatable and does not require access to the source code. The notion behind this 
technique is that the randomly generated inputs often exercise overlooked corner cases in 
the parsing component and error checking code. This technique has been shown to be 
effective in uncovering errors [14], and is used heavily by security researchers [4]. Yet it 
also suffers from several problems: a single unsigned int value can vary from 0 to 65535; 
adding another int value to the input domain causes the input space to grow exponentially, 
which can hardly be covered with limited time and cost. Furthermore, by only changing 
the input, a fuzzer may not put the application into a state in which the vulnerability will 
appear. White-box fuzzing [7] was introduced to help generate well formed inputs instead 
of random ones and therefore increases their probability of exercising code deep within 
the semantic core of the computation. It analyzes the source code for semantic constraints 
and then produces inputs based on them or modifies valid inputs. White-box fuzzing 
improves the effectiveness of fuzz testing; however, it overlooks the enormous size of the 
input space and also suffers from severe overhead [8]. 
 
ConFu deals with this problem by mutating the configuration rather than randomly 
generating inputs of the program-under-test. The space of the former is considerably 
smaller than the latter and is more relevant in triggering potential illegal states. In 
addition, extending the testing phase into deployed environments ensures representative 
real-world user inputs with which to test. 
 
5.2  Configuration testing 
Researchers and testers have done lots of work in testing software configuration. The 
importance of configuration testing has increased as more and more vulnerabilities are 
discovered to be caused by inappropriate configuration. However, most of these popular 
configuration testing approaches were not designed to reveal security defects. One 
approach named Rachet [26], is designed to test the compatibility of a software by 
mutating configuration in the development process. Rachet models the entire 
configuration space for software systems and uses the model to generate test plans to 
sample a portion of the space, and later uses these test plans to test the compatibility 
between the software and other software during its compile time.  
 
Another approach called Skoll [17] is composed of software quality assurance (QA) 
processes that leverage the extensive computing resources of volunteer communities to 
improve software quality. Skoll takes a QA process' configuration space to build a formal 
model that captures all valid configurations for QA subtasks, and uses this model to 
generate test cases for each machine in the community. The idea is to reduce duplication 
and spread testing burden across the community. Skoll collects the pass/fail results of all 
the tests to provide feedback to the developers.  
 
Both of these approaches are able to detect functionality errors when the program-
under-test fails. However, vulnerabilities such as security defects are more difficult to 
find since most of them will not lead the program to failure. ConFu deals with this 
problem by checking the violations of security invariants with surveillance functions. 
Whereas vulnerabilities such as directory traversal and insufficient privilege control can 
easily hide themselves from being detected by Rachet or Skoll, ConFu can still catch 
these vulnerabilities when they alter the values of the security invariants. 
 
6    LIMITATIONS 
The most critical limitation of the current implementation is that testers’ intervention is 
required to identify the functions to test.  In principal, one can always choose the main() 
function, but it might be less efficient and increase the overhead. A better way to 
determine the function-under-test might be picking the most frequently called functions 
according to real world usage, or choosing the currently running function with a run-time 
injection approach such as the one proposed by Antoni et al. [1], or. We leave this as 
future work. 
 
ConFu relies on surveillance functions that check for violations of security invariants 
to detect vulnerabilities. Therefore, software testers need a priori knowledge of the 
potential exploitation behavior in order to design specific surveillance functions. ConFu’s 
built-in surveillance functions check for common security invariants and are capable of 
detecting most well-known exploits, e.g. denial of service, directory traversal, etc. 
However, they might not be as effective in detecting zero day vulnerabilities.  
 
Because each configuration is only tested with relatively few inputs, the chance of 
detecting a vulnerability that would only be revealed under one specific configuration 
with one particular input is relatively low using the current ConFu implementation. A 
distributed version of ConFu would increase the efficiency of detecting such 
vulnerabilities, in which the testing assignments are split amongst applications running in 
a homogenous “application community” [16]. We have developed a distributed In Vivo 
Testing framework [3] and we leave it as future work to develop a global coordinator that 
is in charge of allocating test cases for each deployed configuration across the user 
community, and collecting and analyzing the results for ConFu. 
 
7    CONCLUSION 
In this thesis, we explored an approach for software vulnerability detection in the domain 
of security testing [28] and developed a framework called ConFu based on our approach 
[29]. Vulnerability detection is difficult to achieve not only because the characteristics of 
vulnerabilities are hard to define but also because of the immensity of the input and 
configuration space. Our proposed approach, Configuration Fuzzing, deals with these 
problems by extending the testing phase into the deployment environment while ensuring 
a considerable degree of coverage configuration space and representative samples of the 
input space. Surveillance functions that check for violations of security invariants are 
executed during Configuration Fuzzing in order to detect vulnerabilities. Configuration 
Fuzzing tests happen in a duplicated copy of the original process, so that they do not 
affect the state of the running application. As future work, we are planning to develop a 
distributed version of ConFu with a full-fledged sandbox, which will significantly further 
its potential in detecting software vulnerabilities. We believe that ConFu can help 
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Appendix A Annotated OpenSSH Configuration File  
 










PermitRootLogin yes #[options.permit_root_login]@{0,1} 
# 
# Don't read ~/.rhosts and ~/.shosts files 
IgnoreRhosts yes #[options.ignore_rhosts]@{0,1} 
# Uncomment if you don't trust ~/.ssh/known_hosts for 
RhostsRSAAuthentication 
#IgnoreUserKnownHosts yes  
StrictModes yes #[options.strct_modes]@{0,1} 
X11Forwarding no #[options.x11_forwarding]@{0,1} 
X11DisplayOffset 10 
PrintMotd yes #[options.print_mod]@{0,1} 





#obsoletes QuietMode and FascistLogging 
 
RhostsAuthentication no #[options.rhosts_authenticaiton]@{0,1} 
# 
# For this to work you will also need host keys in 
/etc/ssh_known_hosts 
RhostsRSAAuthentication no #[options.rhosts_rsa_authenticaiton]@{0,1} 
# 
RSAAuthentication yes #[options.rsa_authenticaiton]@{0,1} 
 
# To disable tunneled clear text passwords, change to no here! 
PasswordAuthentication yes #[options.password_authenticaiton]@{0,1} 
PermitEmptyPasswords no #[options.permit_empty_passwd]@{0,1} 
# Uncomment to disable s/key passwords  
#SkeyAuthentication no 
 
# To change Kerberos options 
KerberosAuthentication no #[options.kerberos_authentication]@{0,1} 
KerberosOrLocalPasswd yes #[options.kerberos_or_local_passwd]@{0,1} 
AFSTokenPassing no 
KerberosTicketCleanup no #[options.kerberos_ticket_cleanup]@{0,1} 
 
# Kerberos TGT Passing does only work with the AFS kaserver 
#KerberosTgtPassing yes 
 
                                                                                                                                                 
CheckMail no #[options.check_mail]@{0,1} 
UseLogin no #[options.use_login]@{0,1} 
 
Appendix B  Fuzzer Code Using Jenny 
 
/* a fuzzer which generates covering array. */ 
int fuzz(int* cnt,...) 
{ 
 static int way = 0; /* specify which way we are in */ 
 FILE *test2 = fopen("2way.carray", "r"); 
 FILE *test3 = fopen("3way.carray", "r"); 
 FILE *test4 = fopen("4way.carray", "r"); 
 FILE *test5 = fopen("5way.carray", "r"); 
 FILE *test6 = fopen("6way.carray", "r"); 
 if(test2){ 
  fclose(test2); 
  way = 2; 
 } 
 else if(test3){ 
  fclose(test3); 
  way = 3; 
 } 
 else if(test4){ 
  fclose(test4); 
  way = 4; 
 } 
 else if(test5){ 
  fclose(test5); 
  way = 5; 
 } 
 else if(test6){ 
  fclose(test6); 
  way = 6; 
 } 
 int count =*cnt; 
 int i,j; 
 int *tmp; 
 char jenny[512] = "jenny -n2"; /* Put jenny in /bin on the 
host */ 
 char content[256] = "\0"; 
 char out[256] = " > 2way.carray"; 
 char cmd1[256] = "2way.carray"; /*cmd[0]*/ 
 char cmd2[256] = "sed '1d' 2way.carray > array.tmp"; 
/*cmd[9]*/ 
 char cmd3[256] = "cp array.tmp 2way.carray";/*cmd[13]*/ 
 char cmd4[256] = "rm -f 2way.carray";/*cmd[6]*/ 
 char cmd5[256] = "3way.carray";/*cmd[0]*/ 
 char cmd6[256] = "sed '1d' 3way.carray > array.tmp";/*cmd[9]*/ 
 char cmd7[256] = "cp array.tmp 3way.carray";/*cmd[13]*/ 
 int nposition = 8 + count * 2 + 4; 
 va_list ap; 
 va_start(ap, *cnt); 
                                                                                                                                                 
 for(; count>0; count--){ 
  strcat(content, " 2"); 
 } 
 strcat(jenny, content); 
 strcat(jenny, out); 
 /*The cnt -9 field is for digits bigger than 9*/ 
 int x = (*cnt) * 3 + 1; 
 if(*cnt > 9) x+=(*cnt) - 9; 
 char buf[x]; 
 switch (way) { 
  case 0:  
   //printf("full command is: %s\n", jenny); 
   system(jenny); 
   char filename[100] = "2way.carray"; 
   FILE *file = fopen(filename,"r"); 
   if (fgets( buf, x, file)){ 
    buf[x-1]='\0'; 
    //printf("the buf is %s\n",buf); 
    fclose(file); 
    system("sed '1d' 2way.carray > array.tmp"); 
    system("cp array.tmp 2way.carray"); 
    system("rm -f array.tmp"); 
   /* assign values to global variables */ 
    for(i=0,j=0;i<strlen(buf);i++){ 
     if(buf[i]=='a'){ 
      tmp = va_arg(ap, int*); 
      *tmp=0; 
      j++; 
     } 
     if(buf[i]=='b'){ 
      tmp = va_arg(ap, int*); 
      *tmp=1; 
      j++; 
     } 
    } 
   } 
   return 0; 
  case 2:  
   printf("!!!!in case 2 now\n"); 
   jenny[8] = '3'; 
   jenny[nposition] = '3'; 
   break; 
  case 3:  
   printf("!!!!in case 3 now\n"); 
   cmd1[0] = '3'; 
   cmd2[9] = '3'; 
   cmd3[13] = '3'; 
   cmd4[6] = '3'; 
   if(*cnt >= 4){ 
    cmd5[0] = '4'; 
    cmd6[9] = '4'; 
    cmd7[13] = '4'; 
    jenny[8] = '4'; 
                                                                                                                                                 
    jenny[nposition] = '4'; 
   }else { 
    cmd5[0] = '2'; 
    cmd6[9] = '2'; 
    cmd7[13] = '2'; 
    jenny[8] = '2'; 
    jenny[nposition] = '2'; 
   } 
   break; 
  case 4:  
   printf("!!!!in case 4 now\n"); 
   cmd1[0] = '4'; 
   cmd2[9] = '4'; 
   cmd3[13] = '4'; 
   cmd4[6] = '4'; 
   if(*cnt >= 5){ 
    cmd5[0] = '5'; 
    cmd6[9] = '5'; 
    cmd7[13] = '5'; 
    jenny[8] = '5'; 
    jenny[nposition] = '5'; 
   }else { 
    cmd5[0] = '2'; 
    cmd6[9] = '2'; 
    cmd7[13] = '2'; 
    jenny[8] = '2'; 
    jenny[nposition] = '2'; 
   } 
   break; 
  case 5:  
   printf("!!!!in case 5 now\n"); 
   cmd1[0] = '5'; 
   cmd2[9] = '5'; 
   cmd3[13] = '5'; 
   cmd4[6] = '5'; 
   if(*cnt >= 6){ 
    cmd5[0] = '6'; 
    cmd6[9] = '6'; 
    cmd7[13] = '6'; 
    jenny[8] = '6'; 
    jenny[nposition] = '6'; 
   }else { 
    cmd5[0] = '2'; 
    cmd6[9] = '2'; 
    cmd7[13] = '2'; 
    jenny[8] = '2'; 
    jenny[nposition] = '2'; 
   } 
   break; 
  case 6:  
   printf("!!!!in case 6 now\n"); 
   cmd1[0] = '6'; 
   cmd2[9] = '6'; 
                                                                                                                                                 
   cmd3[13] = '6'; 
   cmd4[6] = '6'; 
   cmd5[0] = '2'; 
   cmd6[9] = '2'; 
   cmd7[13] = '2'; 
   jenny[8] = '2'; 
   jenny[nposition] = '2'; 
   break; 
 
 } 
 FILE *old = fopen(cmd1, "r"); 
 if (fgets(buf, x, old)){ 
   buf[x-1]='\0'; 
   //printf("line: %s, x=%d\n",buf,x); 
   fclose(old); 
   system(cmd2); 
   system(cmd3); 
   system("rm -f array.tmp"); 
   for(i=0,j=0; i<strlen(buf); i++){ 
    if(buf[i]=='a'){ 
     tmp = va_arg(ap, int*); 
     *tmp = 0; 
     j++; 
    } 
    if(buf[i]=='b'){ 
     tmp = va_arg(ap,int*); 
     *tmp = 1; 
     j++; 
    } 
   } 
 } else { 
  system(jenny); 
  system(cmd4); 
  FILE *new = fopen(cmd5, "r"); 
  if (fgets(buf, x, new)){ 
   buf[x-1]='\0'; 
   //printf("line: %s, x=%d\n",buf,x); 
   fclose(new); 
   system(cmd6); 
   system(cmd7); 
   system("rm -f array.tmp"); 
   for(i=0,j=0; i<strlen(buf); i++){ 
    if(buf[i]=='a'){ 
     tmp = va_arg(ap, int*); 
     *tmp = 0; 
     j++; 
    } 
    if(buf[i]=='b'){ 
     tmp = va_arg(ap,int*); 
     *tmp = 1; 
     j++; 
    } 
   } 
                                                                                                                                                 
  } 
 }  
 return 0; 
} 
 
Appendix C  Preprocessor of CONFU 
 
#!/usr/bin/perl5.10.1 





my $count = @ARGV; 
my $readable = 1; 
my @configuration; 
foreach(@ARGV){ 
 if(not -f $_){ 
  $readable = 0; 
  last; 
 } 
} 
if( $count < 3 or not $readable){ 





open CONFIG, "<", $ARGV[0] || die "Cannot open the configuration 
file. $/"; 
while(<CONFIG>){ 
 if( $_ =~ /\#\[(.*)\]@\{(.*)\}/){ 




#foreach (keys %configuration){ 
# say "$_ ==> $configuration{$_}"; 
#} 
 
my $c_count = scalar @configuration; 




$keys =~ s/,$//; 
my $fuzz_func = "void fuzz_config()\n{\n\tint cnt = 
$c_count;\n\tfuzz(&cnt,$keys);"; 
foreach (@configuration){ 
 state $i = 1; 
 $fuzz_func .= "\n\tchar log$i\[100\] = \"$_ is:\";\n\t"; 
 $fuzz_func .= "sprintf(log$i+strlen(log$i),\"%d\",$_);\n\t"; 
                                                                                                                                                 
 $fuzz_func .= "writelog(log$i);\n\t"; 








 local @ARGV = ("fuzzer.c"); 
 while(<>){ 
  $fuzzcode.= $_; 
 } 
} 










 local @ARGV = ($ARGV[1]); 
 local $^I = '.bak'; 
 while(<>){ 
  if(/\/\*\#CONFU\#\*\//){ 
            $line = $.; 
        }elsif($. == $line + 1){ 
            /^\s*(\w+\**)\s*(\w+)\((.*)\)/; 
            $type = $1; 
            $func_name = $2; 
            $argv = $3; 
            s/$2/CONFU_$func_name/; 
            print; 
        }else{ 
            print; 
        } 




open CHECK, "<", $ARGV[2]; 
while(<CHECK>){ 
    $check_code .= $_; 
    if(/^\w+\s*(\w+)\s*\(/){ 
        $check_func = $1; 
    } 
} 
 
#Hard coded arguments, need to change# 
my $testcode; 
                                                                                                                                                 
$testcode = "\n$type 
CONFU_TEST_$func_name($argv){\n\tfuzz_config();\n\tCONFU_$func_name(
home, file, real);\n\treturn $check_func(home, real);\n}"; 
$fuzzcode .= "\n$check_code"; 
$fuzzcode .= "\n$testcode"; 
 
my $wrapper; 
$wrapper = "$type $func_name($argv){\n\tint pid = fork();\n\tif(pid 
== 0){\n\tCONFU_TEST_$func_name(home, file, 
real);\n\texit(0);\n}return CONFU_$func_name(home, file, real);\n}"; 




 local @ARGV = ($ARGV[1]); 
 local $^I = '.bak2'; 
 while(<>){ 
  if(/\s*\w+\s*main\s*\(/){ 
   print $fuzzcode; 
   print $_; 
  }else{ 
            print; 
        } 
    } 
} 
 
 
 
 
